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Retrospective voting and party support at elections:
credit and blame for government and opposition
Carolina Plescia and Sylvia Kritzinger
Department of Government, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
ABSTRACT
Retrospective voting is arguably one of the most important mechanisms of
representative democracy, and whether or not the public holds the
government accountable for its policy performance has been extensively
studied. In this paper, we test whether retrospective voting extends to parties
in the opposition, that is whether and how parties’ past performance
evaluations affect their vote, regardless of whether they were in government
or in opposition. Taking advantage of a rich set of questions embedded in a
representative German national elections panel, we update our knowledge on
the retrospective voting mechanism by modeling retrospective voting at the
party level. The findings indicate that the incumbent status is not the only
criterion for retrospective voting, ultimately suggesting that both government
and opposition parties can expect credit and blame for their conduct and this
should provide some impetus for responsive performance of all parties.
1. Introduction
Whether or not legislators are judged on what has happened in the past has
significant implications for democratic accountability. Accordingly, a substan-
tial literature has investigated the policy foci and time horizons that guide
voters’ decisions. Almost without exception, the literature on electoral
accountability examines voters facing a binary choice between either support-
ing the incumbent or not (e.g. Fiorina 1981; Berry and Howell 2007), mostly
focused on the economic performance of government (e.g. Paldam 1991;
Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2007). This focus stems from the
notion that evaluations of policy-making are restricted to parties in govern-
ment (Duch and Stevenson 2008). Clearly, however, other parties influence
policy-making and, in many contexts, (e.g. federal systems and minority
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governments), this influence is substantial (Strøm 1990; Powell and Whitten
1993; Lijphart 1999). Therefore, voters’ beliefs should reflect this wider
notion of responsibility at the party level (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Duch
and Falcó-Gimeno 2014). So far, very little empirical work has examined
whether and how the public holds their representatives – and not only the
government – accountable for the country’s current state of affairs.
We employ this wider notion of performance evaluations and model ret-
rospective voting at the party level. While recent studies have started focus-
ing on each party in the coalition government instead of the incumbent
coalition governments as a whole (e.g. van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Frank-
lin 2007; Fisher and Hobolt 2010; Debus, Stegmaier, and Tosun 2014; Wil-
liams, Stegmaier, and Debus 2015), we go one step further. First, we
examine how retrospective evaluations of all parties, regardless of
whether they were in office or not, affect the probability of voting for
these parties. Second, we move beyond economic evaluations and
examine the effect of different types of performance evaluations. We start
with a focus on economic evaluations, by far the most extensively tested
notion of retrospective behavior. We then move to a more general
concept of retrospective accountability, since we know today that the
economy is not the only area in which the public may want to hold their
representatives accountable (e.g. Singer 2011; De Vries and Giger 2014).
This enables us to obtain a fully fledged picture on whether and how
accountability mechanisms can affect political parties as voters’ most
evident representatives (e.g. Strøm 2000).
The substantial application investigates data from a long-term panel of
the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) providing a set of new
measures that directly capture (dis)satisfaction with the performance for
all parties represented in the parliament, the Bundestag. Germany is a
good example of a multi-party system where opposition parties have a rela-
tively strong influence on the policy-making process (Duch and Stevenson
2008). In addition, its history of coalition governments, where multiple
parties compete for shares of policy-making responsibility, calls for a focus
on the party level, rather than on the more abstract level of government
versus opposition (Debus, Stegmaier, and Tosun 2014; Williams, Stegmaier,
and Debus 2015).
The results indicate that the common assumption of retrospective evalu-
ations having a unique or a stronger effect on government parties, when
compared to the opposition, does not hold. Electoral accountability
occurs at the party level with party size playing an important role in respon-
sibility attribution to single parties, regardless of whether they were in gov-
ernment or in opposition. It is not only the prime minister or chancellor
party which is affected the most by retrospective voting (Fisher and
Hobolt 2010; Debus, Stegmaier, and Tosun 2014), but also the largest
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opposition party. We conclude by stating that future research should
examine electoral accountability mechanisms at the party level, considering
both government and opposition.
2. Retrospective voting at the party level
In a simple understanding of political representation, citizens constitute the
principal that delegates authority in decision-making to political actors by
voting for them in elections (Strøm 2000). In this context, electoral account-
ability is said to exist when citizens can retrospectively hold politicians
accountable, and reward or punish them with their vote (e.g. Zelle 1995;
Gidengil et al. 2001; Bélanger 2004; Dassonneville, Blais, and Dejaeghere
2015).1 The existing literature has examined the reward/punish mechanism
by mainly focusing on the economic performance of government parties
(e.g. Anderson 2007; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008). Empirical analyses
regularly find that “when economic conditions are bad, citizens vote against
the ruling party” (Lewis-Beck 1991, 2), even if the strength of economic
voting differs substantially across studies and across settings (Duch and Ste-
venson 2008; Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013).
Very recently, however, the retrospective voting approach of examining
the government performance collectively has come under increasing pressure
(e.g. Fisher and Hobolt 2010; Debus, Stegmaier, and Tosun 2014). This
approach is particularly problematic in countries with multi-party systems
and coalition governments. For one, voters cannot vote for the government
as a whole but only for one party of the coalition. Assuming identical influence
of past performance evaluations on all coalition partners is an unrealistic
restriction (e.g. Anderson 2000; Williams, Stegmaier, and Debus 2015). For
another, in many contexts (e.g. federal systems and minority governments),
the influence of parties out of government on policy-making is substantial
where the responsibility attribution is less clear-cut between government
and opposition parties and controversial policy decision can only be made
in cooperation with the opposition (Strøm 1990; Powell and Whitten 1993; Lij-
phart 1999). It is therefore likely that voters are aware of and use this wider
notion of responsibility when choosing parties in elections (Anderson 2000;
Sanders and Carey 2003; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Duch and Falcó-
Gimeno 2014). To generally evaluate parties, voters might simply take into
consideration the obligations that parties are expected to fulfil in their role
of opposition or government party (e.g. Hobolt and Tilley 2014). Hence,
they might use different information when weighting the performance evalu-
ation of government and opposition parties. While government parties might
be judged more on their policy performance, the evaluation of opposition
parties might be more likely driven by institutional aspects. These circum-
stances make it necessary to test the retrospective voting mechanism not
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only on the government but also at the party level, hence for both the gov-
ernment and the opposition.2
In a first step, we examine the impact of economic evaluations on all
parties. In keeping with the literature, a positive (negative) economic evalu-
ation should increase (decrease) the likelihood to vote for parties in govern-
ment, and should have an opposite or no influence on vote choice for
parties in opposition. In addition, and again in line with the existing literature,
the effect of retrospective voting on the government parties’ vote should be
stronger when citizens assign responsibility for the economic situation to the
government. In a second step, we move from economic-centric evaluations to
a general performance evaluation of parties. Here, we follow the most recent
literature indicating that accountability extends to party performance across
an array of policy areas and not only the economy (e.g. Fisher and Hobolt
2010; Singer 2011; De Vries and Giger 2014). Again, in line with a common
approach, performance evaluations should have a unique or stronger
impact on parties in government when compared to parties in opposition.
If however, as we claim, retrospective voting works for parties both in govern-
ment and in opposition, we should observe economic voting as well as
general performance evaluations to have a different effect across parties
and to matter for parties regardless of their government status.
3. Data, variables and methods
The German Longitudinal Election Study, Component 8 (GLES) (Rattinger et al.
2014) (2009–2017) consists of several waves. It covers, among other things,
the two federal elections of 2009 and 2013.3 Given that substantive con-
clusions are very similar for the two elections, in this paper, we only show
the results for the 2013 elections and report results for the 2009 elections
in the Appendix only (Figures A1 and A2).
Our dependent variable is party choice on Election Day. To measure the
effect of retrospective evaluations on party choice, we apply multinomial
logit models.4 The set of discrete alternatives consists of up to five parties
that are regarded as being most likely to gain parliamentary representation:
the two largest parties, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social
Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the smaller
parties, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Greens and Die Linke (The Left).5
Turning to our independent variables, our main explanatory variable on
economic performance is the economic situation as perceived by the voters:
the variable measures whether the economy has worsened or improved
using a scale from 1 (a lot worse) to 5 (improved a lot). A follow-up question
asks respondents how strongly the policy of the federal government has
affected the economic development, with options spanning from 1 (not at all)
to 5 (very much), thus allowing respondents to ascribe levels of responsibility.
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GLES also collects data on general performance for each of the parties rep-
resented in parliament using the following question: “How satisfied or dissatis-
fied are you with the performance of X party in the government [or in the
opposition]?” The options available to respondents span a scale from −5 to
+5 with higher scores representing a better policy performance. We recode
all performance variables to range from 0 to 1, where 1 represents higher
levels on that specific variable.
In all models, we include partisanship to isolate the effect of voters’ partisan
affiliation on vote choice (e.g. Duch and Stevenson 2008; Tilley, Garry, and
Bold 2008; Tilley and Hobolt 2011).6 We also control for satisfaction with
democracy and several individual-level determinants such as age, gender
and political interest.7
4. Empirical results
To test our expectations, we run three models of party choice for economic
and general performance evaluations. Instead of presenting regression
tables, we simply show the effect of each variable on the predicted probability
of voting for a specific party; regression tables with the exact results are
shown in the Appendix (Table A1).
Starting with the economy, the panel on the left of Figure 1 shows the
effect of retrospective economic evaluations on party choice. The two govern-
ment parties between 2009 and 2013 were the CDU/CSU and the FDP, the
three opposition parties were the SPD, the Greens and Die Linke. We see
that the CDU/CSU is the only party in government that was rewarded when
respondents assessed the economy positively. The effect of positive economic
evaluations on the junior coalition partner, the FDP, is very low to non-exist-
ent. For the parties in the opposition, the impact of positive economic retro-
spective evaluations is negative and only statistically significant for the largest
party, the SPD, and the extreme party, Die Linke. The panel on the right shows
the effect of retrospective economic evaluations on all parties; in this case,
respondents regard the government as responsible for the actual situation
of the economy in Germany. The effect on government is strong; however,
the reward for positive economic evaluations is enjoyed only by the CDU/
CSU. Again, only the SPD and Die Linke are affected in the opposition. In
addition, it is important to note that the negative effect on opposition
parties is only significant at the lower levels of economic evaluations (below
0.5 in the graph), and only when there is responsibility attribution (right
panels). In sum, a positive economic evaluation benefits the largest govern-
ment party and it has a negative effect on the largest party in the opposition;
but it has a rather low effect on all other parties, regardless of whether they
are in government or opposition.
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In the next two steps, we examine performance evaluations beyond the
economy. An overview across all panels of Figure 2 clearly indicates that
the more citizens are (dis)satisfied with a party, the more likely they are
(not) to vote for it. A closer look at each panel tells a more interesting story.
On the one hand, concerning the two big parties, there is an almost parallel
yet opposite effect of their performance on the probability of voting for the
other party, respectively. On the other hand, the impact of the evaluations
of the smaller parties on the probability of voting for one of the largest
parties is quite low. Moving to the smaller parties, we see that the evaluations
of the large parties exert a rather strong effect, pulling voters towards both
large parties until the overall performance evaluations of that specific small
party reach a point of moderate positive evaluations. At this point, the
effect of retrospective evaluations on vote choice is quite large and just a
little below the effects we observe for larger parties. While it seems that
party size matters in establishing which performance is taken into account
when citizens cast a ballot, we see that both large and small parties suffer
from performance evaluations.8 The results are very similar if we look at the
2009 election (in the Appendix), which ended four years of a grand coalition
government between the CDU/CSU and SPD that allowed both parties to
control key cabinet posts for the economy (see Williams, Stegmaier, and
Figure 1. Retrospective economic voting for all parties.
Note: The graph shows the predicted probability of voting for a specific party based on Models 1 and 2,
Table A1. Figures with confidence intervals can be found in the Online Supporting material.
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Debus 2015). A comparison of the two elections indicates that past perform-
ance evaluations influence coalition partners differently, although the SPD in
2009 is affected much more by retrospective evaluations than the FDP in 2013
due to its more dominant role in the party system.
In sum, we find that the accountability mechanism does not appear to
simply be a matter of government approval or rejection, but that it works
mainly at the party level. In line with recent contributions (Debus, Stegmaier,
and Tosun 2014; Duch and Falcó-Gimeno 2014; Williams, Stegmaier, and
Debus 2015), our findings indicate that future research should examine elec-
toral accountability mechanisms at the party level rather than at the more
abstract level of government versus opposition. Above all, our findings
show that both government and opposition parties can expect credit and
blame for their past performance, and that both large and small parties are
exposed to the workings of the retrospective mechanism. While these find-
ings complement previous results for the European Parliament elections
(Marsh 2009; Weber 2011), they are more meaningful as they show that oppo-
sition parties are also subject to retrospective voting in first-order elections.
Figure 2. Retrospective general evaluations and vote choice for all parties.
Note: The graph shows the predicted probability of voting for a specific party based on Models 3, Table A1.
Figures with confidence intervals can be found in the Online Supporting material.
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5. Discussion and conclusion
This paper’s main aim was to update our knowledge on the retrospective
voting mechanism by testing the notion that this mechanism works at the
party level. This effort stems from two contentions. First, the retrospective
voting mechanism, focusing on whether voters support or do not support
the government, clearly works much better in single-party governments
when compared to coalition governments. Second, the widespread disregard
for parliamentary opposition in performance voting literature is largely unjus-
tified when we move from plurality to consensual democracy and from two-
party systems to multi-party systems. On the first issue, our results show that
retrospective evaluations have a stronger effect on the senior coalition
partner compared to the junior partner. This corroborates recent findings in
the literature which indicate that the effect of past performance evaluations
influences coalition partners differently (Fisher and Hobolt 2010; Debus, Steg-
maier, and Tosun 2014; Williams, Stegmaier, and Debus 2015).
On the second issue, the often unspoken assumption in the literature that
performance voting is based solely on voters’ evaluations of the government
parties’ past performance does not find support in our study. In fact, higher
expectations concerning the competence to deliver seem to become most
noticeable among all parties, regardless of their government status. It
shows that the mechanisms of electoral accountability function slightly
more sophisticatedly than previously assumed.
Overall, our findings suggest that government parties should not be the only
ones concerned about the blaming aspect, since all parties can suffer from it.
Rather, it is the voters’ rationale to hold their previously supported party
accountable and this is a key requirement for representative democracy
(Strøm 2000). Given the significant implications of democratic accountability,
it is clearly worth exploring whether our findings also hold in other countries.
Therefore, we finally suggest that national election studies should adapt their
measurement tools on electoral accountability to the party level for future ana-
lyses. In addition, while the focus on policy performance at the party level is well
grounded and important, it would be worth establishing why people are satis-
fied with the performance of a given party regarding aspects such as the ability
to compromise or vice versa of keeping closely to their positions.
Notes
1. Voters may also decide to exit the system altogether (e.g. Weber 2011). Our data
provide us with full information about vote choice. However, exit was rarely
chosen, and for this reason, we do not focus on abstention in this paper. This
decision also stems from the fact that our results must balance each other out
and as support for one party goes up, support for some other party needs to
go down.
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2. Some research has also investigated retrospective voting at the level of the indi-
vidual Member of Parliament (MP) finding that policy accountability of MPs is
rather weak (e.g. Vivyan and Wagner 2012).
3. Sampling was based on multi-level random sampling of a population comprising
all German residents of a minimum age of 16 years. Both the 2009 and 2013
surveys were face-to-face surveys with standardized questionnaires (CAPI). It is
known that panelists are not a random sample out of the initial cross-section
sample of respondents (Frankel and Hillygus 2014; Warren and Halpern-Manners
2012). To address this issue, we run additional tests (e.g. Heckman probit selection
models) to check whether the findings are sensitive to sample selection bias.
Accounting for sample selection bias confirms our substantive conclusions.
4. A possible alternative to a multinomial logit model would be to run a conditional
logit model for the general performance models and thereby include only one
performance indicator for each party-choice. We, however, decided to run multi-
nomial logit models for both the economic evaluation and the general perform-
ance to have the same dependent variable in both sets of models and provide a
more straightforward comparison.
5. German voters cast two votes, a proportional vote to choose national parties and
a plurality vote to choose local candidates. In this paper, we rely on the former
because we are interested in the national performance of parties. Note, however,
that switching to the candidate vote leads to similar albeit weaker conclusions.
This would be in line with the idea that voter knowledge regarding candidates is
lower than that of parties (e.g. Pattie and Johnston 2004).
6. Some have argued that people’s perceptions of policy performance are shaped
by their political orientation – notably partisanship (Wlezien, Franklin, and
Twiggs 1997; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Evans and Andersen 2006) –
others (e.g. Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008) have questioned this. To
account for a possible perceptual bias, that is, voters who feel close to a political
party are likely to evaluate its performance more positively through a “partisan
lens”, our supporting material shows additional models in which retrospective
evaluations have been interacted with partisanship, and models in which party
identification has been excluded all together. The findings support our substan-
tive conclusions. In the Online Supporting Material, we also include Table S3 con-
taining a correlation matrix of all evaluations and party identification variables.
7. Strategic voting is an important aspect of voting behavior within the German
context (Pappi and Thurner 2002; Gschwend 2007). Using a 0–10 sympathy
scale, we build a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the party voted for
is the voter’s most preferred party, and 0 otherwise. Our results are robust to
the addition of this variable.
8. Party size might capture other party characteristics such as the effect of main-
stream versus that of niche parties.
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General performance
(SPD)
−1.07 −0.99 0.46 −0.68
(0.82) (1.21) (1.10) (1.12)
General performance
(FDP)
5.31*** 5.42*** −1.70 −1.02
(1.08) (1.22) (1.36) (1.35)
General performance
(Greens)
1.50 1.04 9.22*** 0.91
(0.97) (1.11) (1.48) (1.27)
General performance
(Linke)
0.76 0.30 −0.10 9.09***
(0.81) (0.97) (1.00) (1.35)
Party identification
(CDU)
−1.90*** −1.75*** −1.32** −0.28 −0.21 −0.76 −1.02+ −0.89 −0.34 −1.91*** −1.74** −0.72
(0.38) (0.39) (0.44) (0.47) (0.47) (0.51) (0.54) (0.54) (0.64) (0.58) (0.59) (0.69)
Party identification
(SPD)
3.86*** 4.05*** 2.89*** 0.38 0.46 0.30 3.17*** 3.22*** 2.56*** 2.55*** 2.70*** 2.41***
(0.40) (0.41) (0.44) (0.87) (0.88) (0.90) (0.54) (0.54) (0.60) (0.51) (0.53) (0.62)
Party identification
(FDP)
0.63 0.75 1.01 3.20*** 3.24*** 2.62*** −34.37 −37.47 −17.76 0.25 0.40 2.02
(0.82) (0.83) (1.02) (0.73) (0.73) (0.79) (4.1e + 07) (2.0e + 08) (13697.56) (1.21) (1.21) (1.45)
Party identification
(Greens)
1.80** 1.98** 1.07 −12.30 −11.79 −12.37 4.57*** 4.61*** 3.67*** 0.99 1.11 1.21

















SPD FDP Greens Die Linke
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Party identification
(Linke)
1.31+ 1.36+ 0.86 1.03 1.02 0.87 1.64+ 1.62 1.57 4.67*** 4.71*** 3.91***
(0.77) (0.78) (0.84) (1.23) (1.23) (1.29) (1.00) (1.00) (1.09) (0.69) (0.69) (0.81)
Satisfaction with
democracy
1.08+ 0.90 0.36 −0.48 −0.50 −0.29 1.78* 1.81* 0.63 2.94*** 2.82*** 1.52+
(0.60) (0.60) (0.70) (0.83) (0.83) (0.96) (0.76) (0.77) (0.89) (0.73) (0.74) (0.91)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 −0.02+ −0.02+ −0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female −0.04 −0.13 −0.02 0.21 0.21 0.17 −0.28 −0.30 −0.24 0.01 −0.03 0.20
(0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.36) (0.37) (0.38) (0.34) (0.35) (0.39) (0.35) (0.36) (0.42)
Political interest −0.67 −0.71 −0.38 −1.01 −1.11 −1.69+ −0.34 −0.42 0.23 −1.79* −1.79* −0.11
(0.67) (0.69) (0.80) (0.86) (0.86) (0.92) (0.83) (0.85) (0.98) (0.85) (0.86) (1.03)
Constant −0.70 −6.00*** −1.33 −2.51* −4.79* −3.12* −1.46 −3.91* −2.06 −1.52 −7.06*** −4.27**
(0.81) (1.48) (0.99) (1.12) (2.29) (1.43) (1.03) (1.61) (1.26) (1.06) (1.93) (1.32)
N 851 851 851
Pseudo-R2 0.45 0.46 0.56
LL −659.07 −646.16 −527.52
AIC 1406.14 1396.31 1175.04




























Figure A1. Retrospective economic voting for all parties (2009).
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Figure A2. Retrospective evaluations and vote choice for all parties (2009).
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